



Safer Communities Partnership Board

22nd July 2022

Title	Prevent Duty Performance Report
Report of	Chair of the Safer Communities Partnership Board
Wards	All
Status	Public
Urgent	No
Key	No
Enclosures	Nil
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Summary

An update of Barnet's Prevent Strategy 2021 – 2025 performance, highlighting challenges and successes, changes in government policy, that could affect local delivery, and highlighting any issues or areas of concern or opportunity.

The report will deliver a profile of actions to drive Prevent delivery into 2022/23 to become a more community focussed and led programme, increasing transparency, trust, and engagement.

Officers Recommendations

1. That the Safer Communities Partnership Board promote Prevent to communities as a safeguarding process.

2. That the Safer Communities Partnership Board members play an active role in overseeing and scrutinising Prevent through engagement with the Prevent Delivery Group.
3. That the Safer Communities Partnership Board Encourage and engage partners to seek opportunities for staff training to raise awareness of the Prevent Duty to a wider audience.

1. Why this report is needed

- 1.1 The Prevent Duty under the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 requires all specified authorities to have “due regard to the need to prevent people being drawn into terrorism”; local authorities and our partners therefore have a core role to play in countering terrorism at a local level and helping to safeguard individuals at risk of radicalisation.
- 1.2 Effective multi-agency partnership working is essential for the successful delivery of the Prevent Duty. Scrutiny of performance and transparent governance to oversee delivery of our duty will ensure we meet what is required of grant funding and statutory obligations as a Local Authority.
- 1.3 To outline performance and delivery of services engaged to safeguard vulnerable people at risk of exploitation.
- 1.4 Prevent relies heavily on professionals and community groups to identify those that may be at risk of radicalisation. It is imperative that we are all aware of our responsibilities and have the confidence and knowledge to seek support and guidance for those most at risk.
- 1.5 To update the Safer Communities Partnership Board of the risk and threat of radicalisation and extremism in Barnet.

Barnet Counter-terrorism Local Profile

- 1.6 The revised Prevent Duty Guidance for England and Wales, updated April 2021, states that local authorities should “use existing counter-terrorism local profiles (CTLPs) to assess the risk of individuals being drawn into terrorism.” This was further emphasised by the Prevent Duty Toolkit for Local Authorities and Partner Agencies published in September 2018, which listed Benchmark 1.1 for compliance as “the Organisation has a local risk assessment reviewed against the Counter Terrorism Local Profile
- 1.7 The North Cluster CTLP was released to Barnet Local Authority following input at two assessment days from North London Cluster Prevent teams, as well as the provision of a qualitative submission by each area. At the time of writing, the threat from terrorism to the UK was assessed to be **SUBSTANTIAL** (an attack is likely).
- 1.8 The CTLP provides an assessment of the terrorism threat to North London which informs the risk assessment and the actions developed in the Prevent Action Plan 2021-25. The key points noted are:

- 1.8.1 Low-complexity attacks mounted by Islamist self-initiated terrorists continue to present the most significant threat to London. These attackers are likely to be acting without direction from a wider network and remain difficult to detect and disrupt.
- 1.8.2 Attacks by self-initiated terrorist are likely to focus on iconic London locations which historically gain more praise in extremist media and have featured in a recent re-emergence of London-focused online propaganda. However, the Streatham High Road attack in February 2020 shows that crowded targets of opportunity remain at risk.
- 1.8.3 Inspiration for attacks is most often drawn from a broader Islamist cause, rather than that of a specific group. Daesh's ability to direct external operations and attacks has dissipated with their loss of territory, but the group continues to encourage attacks in Europe. Al-Qaeda (AQ) and their aligned groups such as Al-Shabaab remain influential in the UK and may feature in the radicalisation process of London-based violent extremists, but AQ-directed attacks in London are unlikely in the short term.
- 1.8.4 London is likely to see an increasing number of returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) and British nationals currently held in camps in Syria and Turkey in the next 12 months. It is likely successfully returned FTF will engage in some form of terrorist activity, including possible attack planning.
- 1.8.5 Attack planning by "on release from prison environments" remains likely to continue, with both attacks in London since 2019 carried out by former TACT prisoners. Most individuals assessed to pose a threat on release from prison were assessed to pose a threat before entering prison, and careful management of such offenders will be required on release.
- 1.8.6 Self-initiated attacks pose the greatest threat to London from Extreme Right Wing (XRW) terrorists. Individuals engaged in XRW online spaces are most likely to be involved in any attack planning in the next 12 months. High casualty, high-sophistication attacks remain the idealised methodology for XRW terrorists, but the capability required for such attacks is high and likely beyond many XRW actors.
- 1.8.7 Inspiration for attacks and engagement with XRW ideology is often fluid and taken from multiple sources across the XRW spectrum. Groups exist primarily in online spaces and disseminate terrorist material, including content intended to inflame community tensions and encourage attacks. Activity in the North Cluster predominantly revolves around stickering/graffiti, with several incidents reported in Barnet since April 2021.
- 1.8.8 XRW subjects tend to be young in the UK, with minimal previous criminal histories. Several teenagers have been convicted of XRW terrorist offences or have claimed to be founding members/leaders of groups.

Barnet Prevent Risk Assessment

- 1.9 In addition to the CTLP, the context of TACT arrests/convictions and Prevent and Channel casework can also be considered when identifying potential risks. The main radicalisation threat to the borough remains individuals being radicalised or inspired by Islamist ideologies. Barnet has historically seen convictions of individuals resident in or connected to the borough for Islamism-inspired TACT offences, including attack planning. There have been 2 convictions of individuals resident in or connected to the borough for Islamism-inspired offences since 2020.

- 1.10 One individual is known to have travelled from Barnet to overseas conflicts in Syria and has now returned and are being safeguarded by family services.
- 1.11 A XRW threat is of moderate concern, evidenced by graffiti/stickering and potentially XRW-inspired Prevent referrals. This threat may also have been exacerbated during 2021 by ongoing media reporting of migrant-related issues related to the Taliban capture of Afghanistan. Ongoing casework has identified individuals who hold racist views, have attended anti-lockdown protests, or associated with XRW individuals of concern. There has also been a small but growing number of InCel related extremist cases referred and accepted by Channel.
- 1.12 A high number of Prevent referrals and Channel cases have mental health issues in addition to Prevent-related concerns. Assessing the risk levels posed by these subjects is extremely challenging when subjects show aggressive/violent behaviour and language or engage in criminal activity. Subjects with Autistic Spectrum Disorders (ASD) have also proved challenging for intervention providers to engage, making it difficult to assess and address the level of risk present.
- 1.13 A high proportion of accepted Channel cases across all forms of extremism appeared to suggest the subject's risk levels were driven by the subjects' engagement with extremist ideologies and influencers online. This is especially so with young people.

Terrorism Act (TACT) Offences in Barnet

- 1.14 A man who wore T-shirts displaying two banned Palestinian groups in Barnet, pleaded guilty to wearing an article supporting a proscribed organisation and received a 16-week suspended jail sentence.
- 1.15 Four young people, aged between 19 and 20, were arrested in November 2021 for planning to carry out a terror attack. Acting upon intelligence, Counterterrorism Police (SO15) apprehended 2 of them, at a Barnet address, in possession of a knife with intent to carry out an act of terrorism. It is thought the youths remain in custody and SO15 report that no risk remains to the public while investigations continue.

Update on Strategic Delivery of Prevent

- 1.16 The Barnet Channel Panel has consistent participation from SO15, Family Service, CCG, Adult Safeguarding Lead, Probation Service and the Barnet, Enfield and Haringey Mental Health Trust. All hold senior position to enable engagement of resources in support of vulnerable individuals.
- 1.17 Eleven Channel Panels were held during 2021 / 22.
- 1.18 79 enquiries were received for potentially vulnerable individuals, 41 were referred to SO15 for triage and 7 were assessed as requiring discussion at Channel.
- 1.19 The Prevent Delivery Group (PDG), a multi-agency panel who scrutinise Prevent performance in Barnet, met 4 times in line with our Terms of Reference. The PDG have received reports of Action Plan performance, Prevent project delivery, CTLP, Education guidance and training sessions covering Domestic Abuse and Understanding Autism.

- 1.20 Bi-annual updates are forwarded to the CEO and quarterly reporting is a requirement of the Homeland Security Group as a condition of grant.

Training performance of Council Staff and wider Partnership

- 1.21 LA Prevent guidance identifies a benchmark to meet the Prevent Duty for Authorities, as a minimum, to have a training programme in place for relevant personnel. An expectation of compliance is that all staff, in customer facing roles and within our commissioned services, are aware of signs of possible radicalisation and understand when and how to make referrals to get additional advice and support.
- 1.22 During 2021 / 22, 47 Prevent related workshops were delivered to 1,263 professionals working in education, family services and other areas including Fostering and those working with individuals who are facing challenges such as learning difficulties and ASD.
- 1.23 To evidence the impact of these awareness sessions, 79 enquiries, seeking advice and guidance, were received from a range of services including, schools, community groups and social care.
- 1.24 Further workshops are delivered directly to identified vulnerable cohorts such as young people. These aim to build resilience and raise awareness of online dangers and risk from Fake News, Conspiracy and Misinformation.

Building Resilience / Community Cohesion

- 1.25 The Prevent Local Toolkit for Local Authorities outlines the importance of a communications plan to proactively communicate and increase the transparency of Prevent work. We are also expected to engage with a range of community and civil society groups.
- 1.26 A formal communications plan is owned which proactively communicates the impact of Prevent to professionals and communities.
- 1.27 32 separate examples of community groups engaging with the Prevent Team were recorded last year.
- 1.28 In addition to awareness workshops for professionals, the Barnet Prevent team delivered resilience sessions for young people and their families. 3300 primary and secondary students received age-appropriate presentations and 223 parents attended online safety programmes.
- 1.29 Barnet have been successful in a grant application to support a media campaign to highlight the positive outcomes and aims of Prevent. The project will work with a young person's organisation with a focus on producing a short film and opportunities for positive social media.

Emerging government strategies, policies and landscape impacting on Prevent

- 1.30 The Independent Review of Prevent, led by William Shawcross, has concluded. The Home Office have been presented with the final recommendations and it is hoped a final report will be received soon. The review looked at several areas: achievement of

objectives, efficiency at local and national levels, implementation and recommendation for the next 5 years and other engagement activity.

2. Reasons for recommendations

- 2.1 Barnet Local Authority, commissioned services and our community partners, have a core role to play in safeguarding at a local level, helping to protect vulnerable individuals from those that may want them to harm others or themselves.
- 2.2 Prevent **operates in a pre-criminal space**, providing support and re-direction to vulnerable individuals at risk of being radicalised and drawn into terrorist activities before any crimes are committed. Radicalisation is comparable to other forms of manipulation, harm and abuse and is considered a safeguarding and protection process. To be successful in eliminating the threat from violent extremism we need to build trust with our communities and work in partnership with them. Our communities already do much to challenge and reduce the influence of extremists. Our role will be to continue to support and complement and to empower those at risk to make positive life choices.
- 2.3 It is essential that there is strategic oversight of Prevent performance and the Duty is championed in our communities.

3. Alternative options considered and not recommended

- 3.1 Members of the Safer Communities Partnership attend the Prevent Delivery Group (PDG) on a regular basis, contributing to the wider scrutiny of Prevent performance in Barnet.
- 3.2 The Prevent Coordinator delivers a 40 minute Prevent awareness session to the Safer Communities Partnership when next they meet.

4. Post decision implementation

- 4.1 If agreed the Prevent Coordinator will share details of the PDG meeting dates to enable attendance from those members wishing to attend.
- 4.2 The Prevent Coordinator will share details of the Prevent Duty and workshop content for consideration.

5. Implications of decision

5.1 Corporate Priorities and Performance

- 5.1.1 Barnet will be in an enhanced position to meet the requirements of the Prevent Duty “to have due regard to the need to prevent people being drawn into terrorism”. We all have a core role to play in countering terrorism and helping to safeguard individuals at risk.
- 5.1.2 The Barnet Plan for 2021 to 2025 identifies that one of the top 3 priorities of residents is “making neighbourhoods safer” At the heart of Prevent is safeguarding and protection,

providing early intervention to drive vulnerable people away from terrorist activity,

- 5.1.3 The implementation of the Barnet Prevent Action Plan and approving the recommendation in this report supports Barnet in achieving the commitment set out in the Corporate Plan to “Adopt preventative measures to help people remain healthy, happy and independent in all aspects of life” and to promote “a strong cohesive community, where diversity is celebrated”

5.2 **Resources (Finance & Value for Money, Procurement, Staffing, IT, Property, Sustainability)**

- 5.2.1 The Prevent Coordinator and Prevent Education Officer posts are funded through Homeland Security Group Grant Agreements which is assessed annually.
- 5.2.2 The project proposed for 2022/23 is funded directly by the Homeland Security Group.
- 5.2.3 There are no other financial implications arising from the recommendations of this report.

5.3 **Legal and Constitutional References**

- 5.3.1 The Counterterrorism and Security Act 2015 contains a duty on specified authorities to have “due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism”. This is also known as the Prevent Duty
[Prevent Duty Toolkit for Local Authorities](#)
- 5.3.2 The Prevent Duty is re-affirmed in the Government’s Counter Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST) published in 2018 which can be accessed here:
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-terrorism-strategy-contest-2018>

5.4 **Insight**

- 5.4.1 Not relevant to this report.

5.5 **Social Value**

- 5.5.1 Not relevant to this report.

5.6 **Risk Management**

- 5.6.1 Risk management varies according to the different initiatives. The partnership or appropriate agencies are made aware of risks and actions to mitigate these risks are agreed and put in place. There is always risk that the partnership may not achieve the targets set due to factors outside its direct control – however there is strong partnership working in place enabling agencies to identify and highlight risk and be open to addressing the risk collectively.
- 5.6.2 Prevent is a statutory duty and a Prevent Corporate Risk Assessment is monitored to ensure the requirements of the duty are met should the funding from the Homeland Security Group cease. The document allocates responsibilities to senior post holders within the Local Authority, championed and managed by existing roles and duties.
- 5.6.3 Controls are in place through the Local Authorities Assurance Risk Register which identifies Prevent as a statutory duty and assigns the risk owner at director level.

5.7 Equalities and Diversity

5.7.1 Equality and diversity are considered for the delivery of the Prevent Duty. Considerations are: Could the Prevent Duty and development of the Action Plan have an impact in relation to: Age • Disability • Gender or Gender Re-assignment • Marriage or Civil Partnerships • Pregnancy and Maternity • Race • Religion or Belief • Sexual Orientation?

- Age: Radicalisation can happen at any age, but current evidence suggests it is young people who are more likely to be influenced, however, the Borough's Prevent Duty Action Plan applies equally to all residents regardless of age.
- Disability: No perceived impact.
- Gender: Recent evidence has shown that both genders are at risk of radicalisation. The Borough's Prevent Duty Action Plan applies equally to all residents regardless of gender.
- Gender Reassignment: No perceived impact.
- Marriage and Civil Partnership: No perceived impact.
- Pregnancy and maternity: No perceived impact.
- Race: No race is identified as more vulnerable to radicalisation than any other. WRAP training emphasises that the Prevent Duty applies equally to anyone at risk of radicalisation regardless of race.
- Religion or Religious Belief: The Barnet Prevent Duty Action Plan applies equally to all regardless of religion or religious beliefs.
- Sexual Orientation: No perceived impact.

5.8 Corporate Parenting

5.8.1 Prevent training is rolled out to all teams across Children and Young People Services, including teams responsible for supervising looked after children. In recent months, WRAP sessions have been delivered to staff in the Onwards and Upwards (corporate parenting) team, CST, Fraud teams, the Fostering & Adoption Team and Children in Care teams to ensure staff are aware how to refer concerns where a child is observed to be vulnerable to radicalisation. In recent months, cases of concern have been referred appropriately which indicates that the process is understood.

5.9 Consultation and Engagement

5.9.1 Consultation was undertaken with the stakeholder groups as follows:

5.9.2 The Chief Executive Officer for Barnet has been engaged through quarterly briefing papers which have provided regular updates on delivery of the Prevent Action Plan.

5.9.3 The Council Management Team have received bi-annual updates on progress on Prevent delivery through update reports delivered to the Council Management Team (Assurance) meetings – formerly the Strategic Commissioning Board Assurance meetings.

- 5.9.4 The Prevent Delivery Group has met quarterly and provided updates to the local Barnet partnership on Prevent and Community Engagement issues.
- 5.9.5 Annual Prevent update reports and briefings are provided to the following boards: Safer Communities Partnership, The Children's Safeguarding Board, Health and Wellbeing Board and the Adult Safeguarding Board.

5.10 **Environmental Impact**

- 5.10.1 There are no direct environmental implications from noting or acting on the recommendations. Implementing the recommendations in the report will lead to a positive impact on the Council's carbon and ecology impact, or at least it is neutral.

6. Background papers

6.1 Papers that inform this report and our responsibilities towards the Prevent Duty:

- 6.1.1 Counter Extremism Strategy.
[Counter-Extremism Strategy - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/counter-extremism)
- 6.1.2 Counter-terrorism Strategy.
[Counter-terrorism strategy \(CONTEST\) 2018 - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/counter-terrorism)
- 6.1.3 Prevent Duty Toolkit for Local Authorities and Partner Agencies.
[prevent duty toolkit \(publishing.service.gov.uk\)](https://publishing.service.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-toolkit)
- 6.1.4 Barnet Prevent Strategy.
barnet.gov.uk/community/community-safety/radicalisation-and-prevent

